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Liability for Professional Services: The Interface of 
Contract, Tort and Purely Economic Loss 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The decision in the High Court of Australia in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v 
CDG Pty Ltd1 while per se of particular interest to the construction industry, raises 
more fundamental issues of the relationship between contract and tort where the claim 
is for purely economic loss. In essence the decision poses the question whether in 
certain circumstances, where a claim is for purely economic loss, our two great 
“branches of the law of obligations”2 are independent or is tort subservient to the law 
of contract? The suggestion in this article is that in certain circumstances of purely 
economic loss, policy rather than principle underpins the common law’s denial of a 
tort action due to the presence of rights, or potential rights in contract. 
 
 
The Facts and Decision in Woolcock 
The facts in Woolcock were concisely stated by the majority(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne and Heydon JJ.) as follows:3 
 “In 1987, the first respondent, a company carrying on business of consulting 
engineers, designed a warehouse and offices in Townsville. The land on which this 
building was to be built was owned by the trustee of a property trust. Some years after 
the building was finished it was sold by the then trustee of the property trust to the 
appellant. The contract for the sale of the land did not include any warranty that the 
building was free from defect and there was no assignment  by the vendor of any 
rights that the vendor may have had against others in respect  of any such defects. 
More than a year after the appellant bought the land, it became apparent that the 
building was suffering substantial structural distress. The distress was and is due to 
the settlement of the foundations of the building, or the material below the 
foundations, or both. The appellant alleges that the first respondent and its employee, 
                                                 
1 [2004] HCA 16 (not available in authorised reports at time of writing)    
2 Ibid at para 130 
3 Ibid at 1,2,38 
 
 
the second respondent, each owed it a duty to take reasonable care in designing the 
foundations for the building. The respondents deny that they owed the appellant any 
duty of care; they say that despite advising the then owner of the land to allow them to 
obtain soil tests, the then owner instructed them to proceed without the soil tests and 
to use structural footing sizes provided by the builder.  
Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd brings this appeal against an order of the Court 
of Appeal of Queensland. The effect of the order was that the respondents, in 
providing services concerning the construction of a building complex, did not owe 
Woolcock, as a subsequent purchaser of the building , a duty to take care to protect it 
from pure economic loss.” 
By a majority of  6:1 (Kirby J dissenting) the High Court decided that neither the 
principles applied in Bryan v Maloney, nor those principles as developed in 
subsequent cases,  supported the appellant’s contention that the respondents owed it a 
duty of care to avoid the pure economic loss which it suffered.  
In Bryan v Maloney4, the Court (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, 
Brennan J dissenting) decided that the builder of a dwelling house owed a derivative 
owner of the house a duty to take reasonable care to avoid the economic loss which 
the derivative owner suffered as a result of the diminution in value of the house when 
the fabric of the building cracked because the footings were inadequate. The majority 
noted that there was no direct relationship between the builder and the derivative 
owner, but concluded that their was a sufficient relationship of proximity between the 
builder and the derivative owner for  a duty of care to arise. 
Brennan J in a vigorous dissent denied any right in a derivative owner to sue for the 
tort of negligence for defects in the quality of the building. His Honour found that 
such defects in quality were a matter governed by contract law. Defects in quality of 
the building and the consequential remedies were governed by the terms of the 
agreement between the builder and original owner, and the terms of the agreement 
between vendor and the derivative owner. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 (1995) 182 CLR 609  
 
 
The Issue 
 
In the abstract, the proposition raised by Woolcock is as follows. A professional X 
contracts with Y, the original owner, to provide a service for Y in relation to some 
property of Y. The contract, as detailed and demanded by Y, requires the service to be 
provided in such a manner which the professional knows is very likely to result in a 
latent defect in the property with a significant risk of purely economic loss being 
incurred by either the first or a subsequent derivative owner of that property (due to 
the latent defect surfacing). Is any right of the derivative owner to sue the professional 
in tort for that economic loss determined and overridden by the rights or potential 
rights under the contract between the professional X and the original owner Y, and/or 
the contract under which the derivative owner acquired the property? 
 
 
“The Anterior Step”5 
 
The reasoning of the High Court of Australia in Bryan v Maloney6 indicated that an 
anterior step in determining the liability of a builder to the derivative owner of a 
domestic residence for purely economic loss resulting from inadequate construction of 
footings by the builder, was the liability and relationship between the builder and the 
original owner of that house. The majority in Woolcock summarised the reasoning of 
the High Court in Bryan v Maloney as follows:- 
 
“It is evident, then, that the conclusion that the builder owed a subsequent 
owner a duty to take reasonable care to avoid the economic loss which that 
subsequent owner had suffered depended upon conclusions that were reached 
about the relationship between the first owner and the builder. In particular, 
the decision in the case depended upon the anterior step of concluding that the 
builder owed the first owner a duty of care to avoid economic loss of that 
kind”7 
 
However, the majority in Woolcock specifically stated that “it was not necessary [in 
Woolcock] to decide whether disconformity between the obligations owed to the 
                                                 
5 Ibid at para 14 
6 (1995) 182 CLR 609 at 622ff. per Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ. 
7 Ibid at para 14 
 
 
original owner under the contract to build or design a building and the duty of care 
allegedly owed to a subsequent owner will necessarily deny the existence of that duty 
of care.”8 But following this conclusion the majority adopted the reasoning of 
Windeyer J in Voli v Inglewood Shire Council9 wherein Windeyer J stated that “the 
terms of the contract between the original owner and the builder is not an irrelevant 
circumstance in considering what duty a builder or engineer owed others.”10 
 
The majority concluded in Woolcock :- 
 
“At the least, that contract defines the task which the builder or engineer 
undertook. There would be evident difficulty in holding that the respondents 
owed the appellant a duty of care to avoid economic loss to a subsequent 
owner if performance of that duty would have required the respondents to do 
more or different work than the contract with the original owner required or 
permitted.”11 
 
It is suggested that the justification for “the anterior step” found in the reasoning in 
Bryan v Maloney is not based in principle but is based in policy. The equating of the 
responsibility which the builder owes to the derivative owner, with the responsibility 
owed to the original owner to prevent purely economic loss, cannot be justified on 
principle, since it denies the independent nature of a tort action, forcing potential 
tortious rights into a contractual matrix. 
 
  
 
 
The relevance of the contract for services between the professional 
and the original owner 
 
What relevance (if any) does the contractual relationship between the professional 
(builder, designer, engineer, architect, repairer, etc) and the original owner (of the 
property) have on the responsibility in tort for negligence of the professional to 
subsequent derivative owners of that property? 
 
                                                 
8 Ibid at para 28 
9 (1963) 110 CLR 74 
10 Ibid at 85 
11 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 16 para 28 
 
 
It is suggested that the correct view is that the contract between the professional and 
original owner of the property to perform certain work for that owner with respect to 
the property is the source and the occasion which creates the positive sphere of 
activity by the professional from which an independent tort duty arises to perform the 
work in such a manner so as not to cause foreseeable physical or economic damage to 
a “neighbour”.12 A “neighbour” in these circumstances is anyone who is so closely 
and directly affected by the work performed by the professional that they ought to be 
in contemplation of the professional as being so affected.13 If the contract as detailed 
and demanded by the original owner requires the professional to perform the work on 
the property of the original owner in such a manner that the professional knows is 
very likely to cause economic loss to a subsequent derivative owner (eg because the 
work is likely to produce a latent defect in the property that is likely to surface after 
ownership of that property has passed to a derivative owner) then the derivative 
owner is a “neighbour” within the Atkinian formulation.  
 
Where a professional undertakes work as required by a contract and the performance 
of that work as detailed in the contract will foreseeably raise a significant risk of 
economic loss to a third party, it is no defence to an action for negligence by the third 
party should the risk eventuate, for that professional to rely on the fact that the work 
they performed was required under a contract. While the contract can determine rights 
and obligations inter se between the parties to the contract and may negate any 
potential tort action by the other party to the contract, against the professional 
performing the work,14 the terms of the contract can have no effect on the liability in 
tort of the professional undertaking the work to the third party. The contract is merely 
the occasion or source of the positive sphere of activity entered upon by the 
professional performing the work which raises a relationship of “neighbourhood” with 
the third party and a consequent tortious duty to that third party. 
 
Disconformity of Obligations 
                                                 
12 See, for instance Le Dain J in Central and Eastern Trust Co v Rafuse [1986] 2  SCR 147 at 204-205;                  
Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609 at 621; Katter, N.A. “Duty of Care in Australia” (1999, LBC 
Information Services, Sydney) pp 112 ff. 
13 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 at 580, 581 per Lord Atkin 
14 (under concurrent liability “tort is the general law out of which the parties may contract”; see 
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 at 193) 
 
 
 
The difficulty referred to in Woolcock15 in holding that a professional owes a duty of 
care to avoid economic loss to a derivative owner where performance of that duty 
would require the professional to perform the work in a way different from the 
detailed obligations under the contract with the original owner, is not a difficulty 
founded in principle but in policy. 
 
The independent and separate tort obligation to the third party, from the work to be 
undertaken under the contract, is not parasitic on the rights and obligations inter se of 
the parties to the contract. There is no difficulty in principle in holding that a 
professional who undertakes to perform work as detailed under a contract, where that 
work will raise a foreseeable risk of economic loss to a third party, may not owe any 
duty to the other contracting party, but will owe an independent and separate tort duty 
to the third party which can only be avoided by the professional either not entering the 
contract, or performing the work in a manner that avoids creating a risk of economic 
loss to the third party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indemnity 
 
The professional entering a contract to perform work as detailed by the other 
contracting party, where that work will create a foreseeable risk of economic loss to a 
third party, could seek an indemnity from the other contracting party should the risk 
eventuate to the third party and the professional be sued. 
 
Policy Decision 
                                                 
15 [2004] HCA 16 at para 28 
 
 
The difficulty of disconformity between the obligation of a professional to the original 
owner and a derivative owner lies in policy not in principle. A consideration for 
courts “is the perception that, in a competitive world where one person’s economic 
gain is commonly another’s loss, a duty to take reasonable care to avoid causing mere 
economic loss to another, as distinct from physical injury to another’s person or 
property, may be inconsistent with community standards in relation to what is 
ordinarily legitimate in the pursuit of personal advantage.”16  
 
The application of this policy consideration would support a view that provision of 
professional services should be encouraged. Where performance of professional 
services is in accordance with the detailed requirements of the contract and will not 
breach any obligation to the other contracting party, no independent tort duty to a 
third party should arise. If the performance of such services could incidentally raise an 
independent tort duty to a third party this would be an unwarranted interference in the 
pursuit of personal gain and a disincentive to the provision of such services. 
 
Against such a policy consideration it may be argued that if the law negates any 
potential tort duty to a third party arising from the performance of the contract then 
the law is positively encouraging unprofessional conduct and sub-standard work by 
allowing the performance of such work with impunity on the part of the professional. 
As Kirby J commented in Woolcock such a negation of responsibility to third parties 
“would relieve professionals … of the very responsibilities for which they were 
engaged.”17 
 
Vulnerability 
 
The relevance of the contract under which the derivative owner acquired the 
property 
 
 Is a potential tort action for negligence by the derivative owner against the 
professional(builder,engineer,etc.), subservient to contractual rights available to the 
derivative owner under the contract by which the derivative owner acquired the 
defective property? 
                                                 
16 Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609 at 618, 619 per Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ. 
17 [2004] HCA 16 at para 134 
 
 
 
 
Policy Decision 
As a matter of policy the common law may deny a right to sue in tort for purely 
economic loss if the party suffering the loss was not vulnerable and could have 
protected itself against such economic loss by potential contractual rights. The 
application of this policy was a significant factor in the denial of a right to sue for 
negligence in Woolcock.18 That is, where a derivative owner of defective property 
could have protected itself against potential economic loss flowing from the defect, 
either by obtaining a warranty of freedom from defect,19 or by taking an assignment 
of any rights which the vendor may have had against third parties in respect of any 
claim for defects in that property,20 a tort action may be denied on policy grounds. 
 
Such a policy decision stems not so much from a desire to deny a tort action per se,but 
to regulate and minimise the circumstances in which purely economic loss can be 
recovered in tort. The recovery of purely economic loss raises the spectre of opening 
floodgates to litigation due to the potential of purely economic loss to manifest at one 
or more removes from the negligence (the ripple effect) and the potential for 
indeterminate liability.21 Consequently, courts are circumspect in permitting the 
recovery of purely economic loss in a tort action if those economic interests could 
have been protected by other means (eg contract). This policy conclusion also stems 
from the historical notion that matters of quality of work and defective property with 
resultant economic loss, are the domain of contract law and should be protected in a 
contractual matrix. Tort is historically concerned with injury to person or property. 22 
 
Where a derivative owner of property containing a latent defect, suffers purely 
economic loss as a result of the defect surfacing, Kirby J has questioned23 the fairness 
of denying a right to sue in tort because the derivative owner could have sought 
                                                 
18 [2004] HCA 16 at paras 23, 24 
19 Ibid at para 31 
20 Ibid 
21 Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad” (1976) 136 CLR 529 at 573-574 per 
Stephen J. 
22 Le Lievre v Gould [1893] 1 QB 491; Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503; Donoghue v Stevenson 
[1932] AC 562 
23 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 16 at paras 168-173 
 
 
protection under the contract with the vendor. Kirby J rightly questions whether it is 
reasonable to force a party to take precautions under a contract, against the possibility 
that the property they are acquiring will contain a latent defect, particularly where the 
nature of the latent defect would not reasonably be expected to be present.24 Why 
should a party acquiring property be expected to take positive steps for protection 
under every contract with the vendor against a remote possibility that the property 
may have a latent defect? Why should the buyer be required to be endowed with this 
foresight and why should a buyer of the property not be entitled to contemplate, that, 
while they may have no right in contract against the vendor, they would still have the 
protection of a potential tort action against any party whose negligence caused the 
latent defect with resultant economic loss to the buyer? 
 
Caveat Emptor 
The notion of caveat emptor in principle, is an irrelevant consideration with respect to 
the rights of a derivative owner of defective property to sue in tort a professional 
whose work caused a latent defect in  that property.25 Caveat emptor is relevant to the 
rights inter se under the contract between the derivative owner and the vendor from 
whom the derivative owner acquired the property. If caveat emptor is deemed to be 
relevant in denying the derivative owner a right to sue a third party in tort for 
negligence, it again forces tort into a contractual matrix and can only be justified in 
policy, not in principle. 
 
 
United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada 
While the current law in the United Kingdom has preferred to keep tortious rights of a 
derivative owner of defective property subservient to the contractual matrix26 both 
                                                 
24 Ibid at para 173 
25 Ibid at para 178 
26 See Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398; Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay 
Parkinson & Co Ltd [1985] AC 210; Curran v Northern Ireland Co v Ownership Housing Association 
Ltd [1987] AC 718; D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England [1989] AC 177; 
Department of the Environment v Thomas Bates & Son Ltd [1991] 1 AC 499 
 
 
New Zealand27 and Canada28 have not been so constrained and permit derivative 
owners to pursue potential rights for negligence. 
 
A line of cases, culminating in Murphy v Brentwood District Council29 in the United 
Kingdom have emphasised that quality of work and defective property per se, 
resulting in purely economic loss are matters of contract law. Lord Bridge expressed 
the United Kingdom position with respect to tortious claims by derivative owners to 
recover purely economic loss for defective premises, by stating that “to permit a tort 
action to recover economic loss resulting from defective premises per se would create 
the obligation of an indefinite transmissible warranty of the quality of the work.”30 
United Kingdom law supports the application of the exclusionary rule to such claims 
thereby  denying any right to recover economic loss unless it is consequential on 
injury to the plaintiff’s person or property. 
 
New Zealand has not endorsed the United Kingdom approach31 and the reasoning in 
the landmark cases of Invercargill City Council v Hamlin32  and Brown v Heathcote 
County Council33 have raised no impediment to recovery in tort by the original or a 
derivative owner of defective property. Cooke P in Invercargill summarised the 
position both with respect to builders and local authorities by stating that since Bowen 
in 1976 it has been accepted that a duty of reasonable care actionable in tort falls on 
house builders and controlling local authorities.34 The Privy Council endorsed the 
approach taken by the New Zealand Court of Appeal. The Privy Council concluded 
that in a succession of cases in New Zealand over the last 20 years it had been decided 
that community standards and expectations demanded the imposition of a duty of care 
                                                 
27 Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1994] 3 NZLR 523 (CA); [1996] 1 NZLR 513 (PC); Brown  v 
Heathcote County Council [1986] 1 NZLR 76 (CA); [1987] 1 NZLR 720 (PC); Craig v Eastcoast Bays 
City Council [1986] 1 NZLR 99 
28 Winnipeg Condominium Corporation No 36 v Bird Construction Co [1995] 1 SCR 85; (1995) 121 
DLR (4th) 193  
29 [1991] AC 398 
30 Ibid at 480 
31 See Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1994] 3 NZLR 513 (CA); [1996] 1 NZLR 513 (PC) 
32 [1994] 3 NZLR 513 (CA); [1996] 1 NZLR 513 (PC) 
 
33 [1986] 1 NZLR 76 (CA); [1987] 1 NZLR 720 (PC) 
34 [1994]  3 NZLR 513 at 522 
 
 
on builders.35  It can be concluded that Invercargill is the benchmark for the approach 
to duty of care in this category of case in New Zealand. 
 
The Canadian position is similar to the New Zealand approach with respect to 
recovery by derivative owners of purely economic loss in tort for defective property. 
The approach in Canada is expressed in the Supreme Court of Canada in Winnipeg 
Condominium Corp No 36 v Bird Construction Co.36 La Forest J, who delivered the 
judgment of the court put the question for decision in the case as follows; “May a 
general contractor responsible for the construction of a building be held tortiously 
liable for negligence to a subsequent purchaser of the building who is not in 
contractual privity with the contractor, for the cost of repairing defects in the building 
arising out of negligence in its construction?”37 The answer given to this question was 
“that no adequate policy considerations exist to negate a contractor’s duty in tort to 
subsequent purchasers of a building to take reasonable care in constructing the 
building, and to ensure that the building does not contain defects that pose foreseeable 
and substantial danger to the health and safety of the occupants.”38 
 
Conclusion 
Stemming the tide of tort litigation for negligence requires that courts be circumspect 
in claims for purely economic loss. The propensity of purely economic loss to 
manifest at one or more removes from the direct effect of negligence, raises 
“floodgate” fears and the potential for a tortfeasor to be exposed to a liability far 
outweighing the wrong done. Where the terms of a contract with respect to some 
property have the effect of creating a significant risk for a third party who is likely to 
acquire that property and suffer purely economic loss, then policy not principle 
underpins the dominance of contract, whereby a potential tort action by the third party 
can be negated. 
 
Two policy issues underlying the negation of any tort action by the third party are as 
follows:- Firstly, the sterilisation of commercial contracts if a party to the contract is 
                                                 
35 [1996]  1 NZLR 513 at 521 
36 (1995) 121 DLR (4th) 193 
37 Ibid at 194 
38 Ibid at 221 
 
 
not exposed to any action (contract or tort) by the other contracting party, but 
incidental to the contract, is exposed to a tort action for negligence by a third party. 
Secondly, where the third party could have protected itself under the contract with the 
vendor by which it acquired the property, against the economic loss of which it now 
complains. 
 
While there is room for debate whether such policy issues justify the negation of a 
right by a third party to sue in tort,39 courts at least should take care that where policy 
is to override principle, this is clearly stated to be the foundation of the court’s 
decision. Otherwise the common law can be distorted, creating significant difficulties 
for legal advisers.  
 
As Callinan J stated in Cattanach v Melchior: 
 
“I cannot help observing that the repeated disavowal in the cases of recourse 
to public policy is not always convincing … It would be more helpful for the 
resolution of the controversy if judges frankly acknowledged their debt to their 
own social values, and the way in which these have in fact moulded or 
influenced their judgments rather than the application of strict legal 
principle.”40 
 
                                                 
39 Woolcock Street Investments v CDG Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 16 per Kirby J at paras 160 and ff. 
40 (2003) 215 CLR 1 at 104 
